British European Airways Flight 548

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(Redirected from Staines air disaster)

British European Airways Flight 548

Occurrence summary

Date

18 June 1972

Type

Deep stall -aircraft misconfigurationcaused by pilot error

Site

Staines, England

Passengers

112

Crew

6

Injuries

0

Fatalities

118

Survivors

0

Aircrafttype

Hawker Siddeley Trident 1C

Operator

British European Airways

Tail number

G-ARPI

Flight origin

London Heathrow Airport

Destination

Brussels Airport

British European Airways Flight 548 was a Trident airliner (registration: G-ARPI) that crashed less than three minutes after departing from London Heathrow Airport, killing all 118 aboard. On Sunday, 18 June 1972, the British European Airways (BEA) Trident 1C departed from London, England for scheduled air service to Brussels, Belgium, but crashed near the town of Staines at 16:11 GMT. The finding of the public inquiry was that the crash resulted from a deep stall caused by the pilot’s error in configuring the aircraft, based on data recovered from the Flight Data Recorder. The accident was the worst air disaster in Britain prior to the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.

The process and findings of the public inquiry were considered highly controversial among British pilots and the public. Extremely poor industrial relations at BEA were suggested as the real underlying cause of the accident and that the flight crew, headed by an experienced and respected senior captain, was wrongly assigned the role of scapegoat, Another, elaborate, unofficial version suggests that poor maintenance of a stall recovery system and unreliable speed sensors misled the flight crew. The recommendations from the public inquiry led to the mandatory requirement for cockpit voice recorders to be installed on heavier, British-registered airliners.

Contents

1 Industrial relations background

1.1 Captain Key’s argument

2 Operational background

2.1 Felthorpe accident

2.2 ‘Orly incident’

2.3 ‘Naples incident’

2.4 Previous accident to G-ARPI

3 Accident synopsis

3.1 Stall warnings

3.2 Eyewitnesses and rescue operations

4 Investigation and Public Inquiry

4.1 AIB investigation and inquest

4.2 Lane Inquiry

4.3 Alternative theories

5 Memorials

6 See also

7 References

7.1 Notes

7.2 Bibliography

8 External links

//


Industrial relations background

The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) had declared Monday 19 June, the day after the accident, as a worldwide protest strike against aircraft hijacking which had become commonplace in the early 1970s. Some support was expected, but the British Air Line Pilots Association (BALPA) left its members to decide individually whether to back the strike or not. Because of the impending strike action, many air travellers amended their plans to avoid disruption and as a result Flight BE548 was full, despite the service operating on Sunday, traditionally a day of light travel.

Meanwhile, BALPA was also in an industrial dispute with BEA, concerning issues of pay and working conditions. The dispute was highly controversial, with clearly defined protagonists (mainly but not exclusively younger pilots) and antagonists (mostly but not only older pilots). At the time of the accident, BALPA had organised a confidential postal ballot to ask its members at BEA whether they wanted to strike.

A group of 22 members of a grade of BEA Trident co-pilots known as Supervisory First Officers (SFOs) were already on strike against BEA, citing their low status and high workload. To compensate for a temporary shortage of fully-qualified co-pilots, SFOs were instructed to occupy only the third flightdeck seat of the Trident and to act in the capacity known as 3, involving operating the aircraft systems and assisting the captain (known as 1 on the BEA Trident fleet) and the co-pilot (known as 2) who between them handled the aircraft. In other airlines and aircraft, the job of BEA Trident SFO/P3s was usually performed by flight engineers. As a result of being limited to the P3 role, BEA Trident SFOs/P3s were denied experience of aircraft handling: something which led to their losing some pay and which they resented. In addition, their status led to a regular anomaly: more-experienced SFO/P3s could only assist while less-experienced co-pilots actually flew the aircraft.

Captain Key’s argument

Tensions and hazards resulting from the positions in which BEA Trident SFOs and young co-pilots were placed came to the fore shortly before the accident. On Thursday 15 June, a captain complained vociferously that the inexperienced co-pilot whom he had been assigned “would be useless in an emergency”. Upset, the…(and so on)

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